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Introduction1  
In recent years there has been increasing academic interest in Islamism in the 
Middle East, not least in Palestinian Islamism championed by groups such as 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which are waging a bloody war of attrition against the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (Milton-Edwards 1996a). 
Interestingly, there has been less concern with Islamism among the Palestinian 
diaspora dispersed in Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Jordan and 
Lebanon. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon number about 350,000 and are the 
second- largest Palestinian diaspora community. Since their forced exile from 
Palestine more than fifty years ago, the majority of the refugees have been living 
in squalid shelters and cramped refugee camps. They now form a disenfranchised 
minority, suffering from economic marginalisation and fearing being excluded 
from future peace settlements, which would leave them exiled in Lebanon.    
 
There is now a large body of research on the Islamist revival among Palestinians 
in the West Bank and Gaza (see, Hroub 2001, Milton-Edwards 1996a, Mishal and 
Sela 2000), but Islamism in the Palestinian diaspora communities in the Middle 
East has not been widely studied. Despite the importance of political activism in 
the refugee camps, and the rise of local Islamist movements, there have been few 
attempts to examine how this has shaped Islamist sentiments among the refugees. 
This paper outlines the sources of Islamism (“political Islam”) among Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon (Figure 1). The primary aim is to increase our knowledge of 
how conditions in the host country (“national”) as well as the quest for Palestinian 
statehood (“nationalism”) have shaped Islamist sentiments in the refugee 
population. The paper is based on interviews with representatives of the refugee 
bureaucracy (NGOs, committees, individuals), political parties and Islamist 
groups as well as specialists on Lebanese Islamism.2  
 
The paper begins with a brief overview of the Palestinian refugees exiled to 
Lebanon since 1948. Next, I sketch the current living conditions in refugee camps 
and outline how the refugees have coped with increasing marginalisation and 
alienation and the implications for Palestinian refugee identity. The growth of 
political activism, in particular Islamic activism, is used to examine the factors 
that contribute to a nascent Islamism among sections of the Palestinian refugee 
community. This is followed by an overview of the major Islamist groups, their 
ideology and their political goals. The paper ends with a discussion of the findings 
and a conclusion.  
 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgements: The paper is based on fieldwork in Lebanon during April–May 2003. 
I am grateful to Mona Nsouli and the Institute for Palestine Studies (IPS) in Beirut for 
granting me a temporary research affiliation with the Institute. I would like to thank 
Ahmad Makkie and Rashid Khatib (Norwegian People’s Aid) for organising interviews in 
Beirut and Jaber Suleiman and Abu Ali Hassan for organising interviews and providing 
translation in Sidon. Finally, I thank Muhammad Ali Khalidi and Henrik Lunden for 
commenting on an earlier draft. None of the above should be held responsible for the views 
expressed here which, along with any mistakes, are solely my own.    
2 I did not undertake to poll or survey the political allegiance of the refugees because this could be 
construed as undesirable political surveillance. 
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Figure 1: Map of Lebanon 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon: A brief history  
In 1948–49 around 100,000 Palestinian refugees fled to Lebanon following their 
exodus from Israel. In the first phase (1948–67) most of them were settled in 
makeshift camps, and from 1950 received help from the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) (Khalidi 2001). In the 
following decade (1967–75) conditions in the camps improved somewhat along 
with a general politicization of the refugee population and a surge of political 
activism following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Jerusalem in June 
1967. Following the signing of the Cairo Accord (1969), Lebanon became a base 
for guerrilla attacks against Israel, but Israeli retaliatory attacks caused a high 
number of casualties, including direct attacks on refugee camps, such as the 
destruction of the Nabatiyeh camp in 1974. This started the civil war in Lebanon 
(1975– 90) and led to the invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon by Israeli 
forces, first in 1978 and again in June 1982, which destroyed a number of refugee 
camps and led to a massive loss of Lebanese and Palestinian civilian lives. The 
period 1975–82 ended with the massacres in two refugee camps located in Beirut, 
Sabra and Shatila, where more than 3,000 refugees were killed (Shahid 2002). In 
the following period (1982–87) war broke out between different Palestinian 
factions as well as between Palestinians and the Shia Amal militia. By 1987 the 
“War of the Camps” had claimed more than 2,000 lives and obliterated refugee 
camps such as Sabra and Burj Barajneh. In the most recent period (1987–2000) 
economic support to Palestinian refugees from the PLO and UNRWA has been 
severely reduced. In 1987 the Lebanese government unilaterally abrogated the 
Cairo Accord, which not only meant ending guerrilla warfare from Lebanese soil, 
but also removed refugee privileges such as the right of work, residence and 
freedom of movement in Lebanon. Political developments have also taken a turn 
for the worse, since the Oslo Accords did not resolve the Palestinians’ right of 
return but deferred it to the stalled “final status talks” (Brynen 1997). Most of the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon hail from northern Palestine and the Galilee 
region. This means that they are barred from returning to their homeland and 
suffer from progressive marginalisation in Lebanon.  
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Refugee camps   
From a legal point of view Lebanon only hosts refugees who in legal terms are 
labelled “foreigners”, but admits no responsibility for them. This responsibility 
rests with UNRWA, which is supposed to provide adequate housing and living 
conditions for the refugees. Of the total 350,000 registered refugees in Lebanon, 
about half (55.4%) live in UNRWA camps (c. 160,000) and “informal” camps (c. 
38,000) (Table 1). The majority of the camps are located adjacent to the major 
coastal cities of Tyre, Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli (Figure 1). The refugees living in 
the “official camps” run by UNRWA are provided with a meagre package of 
services and welfare benefits (schooling, medical care etc.) which are insufficient 
in relation to their present needs (Abbas et al. 1997). The most comprehensive 
study of present living conditions among camp-dwelling Palestinian refugees to 
date (Ugland 2003) finds that the refugees suffer from widespread unemployment, 
poor living conditions, ill health, low education levels and rising illiteracy. 
Lebanon has the highest percentage of camp-dwelling refugees (55.4 %) of all the 
countries hosting Palestinian refugees. This is because of stringent policy 
measures in Lebanon designed to keep the refugees trapped inside cramped and 
squalid camps and shanty towns from which there is no escape – except by 
leaving the country.  
 
Table 1  
Refugee camps in Lebanon 
Name of camp No. of registered refugees 
Ayn Hilweh 44,133 
Nahr el-Bared 28,358 
Rashidieh 24,679 
Burj Barajneh 19,526 
Burj Shemali 18,134 
Beddawi 15,695 
Shatila 11,998 
El-Buss 9,840 
Wavel 7,357 
Mieh Mieh 5,078 
Dbayeh 4,223 
Mar Elias 1,406 
Dikwaneh & Nabatieh (destroyed 
camps) 
15,838 
Total 206,265 
* In most camps the actual number of residents is much higher than the 
official UNRWA figures suggest. Source: UNRWA (Online).  
 
Unable to leave, the majority of the refugees pass their lives in increasingly 
overcrowded refugee camps. Some camps, like Shatila in Beirut, are still heavily 
scarred from the civil war and the “war of the camps” and many residents still 
lack potable water, electricity and sanitary facilities. Because the camp areas 
cannot be enlarged, the residents need to find alternative ways of fitting more 
people into the already cramped space. Their remaining option is to add additional 
stories to existing houses, although building regulations prohibit this. In the larger 
camps shops, bazaars and small enterprises (hairdressers, pharmacies, restaurants 
etc.) have sprung up. In recent years, some of the camps have seen major changes 
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in their ethnic composition or have had sections turned into offices. In Beirut, 
only Burj Baranjeh remains a “pure” Palestinian camp. Currently, more than half 
of the residents in Shatila are Syrian guest workers (Hammarberg 2000).3 A 
number of flats and houses in the tiny Mar Elias camp in Beirut are now used as 
office space for political parties while many of the original residents have moved 
out. In the offices party emblems are proudly displayed, as are posters of slain 
leaders and cadres together with pictures of Palestinian martyrs, as well as other 
examples of group emblems and paraphernalia. In the offices of left-wing parties 
posters of revolutionary icons such as Che Guevara have found their place amidst 
large maps of Mandatory Palestine, the unitary symbol of the Palestinian 
nationalist struggle and the ultimate destination of the exiles. 
 
Refugee camps have their own bureaucracy and leadership, the most important 
being the camp manager and popular committees (PC). The popular committees 
are quasi-official bodies mostly concerned with the daily running of the camps, 
conflict resolution and arbitration, dispensing social provisions (together with 
UNRWA) and being the camps’ mouthpiece vis-à-vis Lebanese authorities and 
law enforcement agencies.4 The popular committee’s main function is to ensure 
law and order within the camps.  
 
The phrase “popular committees” is misleading because the leadership in the  
camps is not based on a popular vote or the projected strength of one group or 
party vis-à-vis others. Instead, the make-up of the committees tends to reflect the 
strength of third-party interests, in particular those of Syria, to which the Lebanese 
authorities as well as Palestinian political groups remain subservient. This is the 
reason why the chairmanship of popular committees in Beirut camps such as Burj 
Barajneh and Shatila is vested with pro-Syrian parties. Instead of openly 
challenging the leadership of popular committees, a common strategy is creating 
rival committees with similar names and functions; this diffuses the political and 
social authority of the committees and makes solving social problems more 
difficult and time-consuming (Suleiman 1999: p. 76).  
 
Since the camps function largely as autonomous bodies, internal “policing” is left 
to the political leadership of the camp. Conflict resolution is mostly local and 
follows customary rules and regulations rather than those inscribed in the 
Lebanese penal code (see, Peteet 1987). This does not mean that the camps and 
their residents are out of reach of Lebanese laws. With the lifting of the Cairo 
Accords by the Lebanese authorities in 1987, the right to conduct military 
activities from Lebanese soil ended, as did the refugees’ formal right to bear arms. 
At one point a deal to surrender arms in return for civic rights was close to being 
accepted by the Lebanese authorities but then fell through. The demand for 
surrendering arms was therefore never enforced. To this day the refugee camps 
are flooded with light arms. While the Lebanese security forces can, and 
sometimes does, enter the camps to round up suspects or search for weapons, the 
authorities prefer monitoring and surveillance instead of military involvement in 
the camps. Ayn Hilwa, the most conflict-ridden camp in the country, is 
surrounded by barbed wire and legal entry is only possible through a few 
                                                 
3 This is one reason for social problems in the camp and the inability to solve them. 
4 Abu Badr (Chairman, PC Burj Baranjeh), interview, 6 May 2003; Abu Hani (Chairman, PC 
Shatila),  interview, 14 May 2003. 
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checkpoints guarded by the Lebanese army, with secondary checkpoints manned 
by armed guards representing the popular committees. In recent years the 
boundaries of all the camps have been more closely demarcated and are subject to 
stricter security measures (Peteet 1998). In addition, the camps themselves have 
come under scrutiny and been branded “security islands”, a euphemism meaning 
that they are beyond the reach of Lebanese law, harbouring weapons and 
sheltering criminals and assassins (see, Suleiman 1999: p. 72). To the refugees, 
however, the camps are better viewed as “islands of insecurity” which serve to 
isolate them from the host population (Sayigh 2000). This has increased the 
refugees’ feeling of alienation from mainstream society and severed personal ties 
to local residents, in effect creating an encapsulated refugee existence and 
identity.  
 
This has intensified the distrust between Palestinians and the host population as 
well as the Lebanese government. Although the recent onslaught on the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza sparked widespread pro-Palestinian 
protest marches in the spring of 2002, this has not eased the refugees’ living 
conditions (Ziade 2002: 56). The general feeling of despair and misery among the 
Palestinians in Lebanon and the refusal to address their plight by the Lebanese 
government has been likened to a “ticking bomb” (Nasrallah 1997: p. 358). So far, 
however, there has not been any open protest from the refugee community, a 
reflection of their precarious situation and constant threat of expulsion. The 
Palestinian diaspora in Lebanon is an impoverished and disenfranchised minority, 
living in a hostile environment. How have the refugees coped with this situation 
during their alienated exile in Lebanon?   
Palestinian identity 
The Palestinians exiled since being expelled from Mandatory Palestine in 1948 
represent the longest lasting refugee exile group in modern history. The forced 
exodus, which the refugees refer to as the “tragedy” (Ar. naqba), is a catastrophic 
event that unites the refugee community and can only be reconciled when the 
refugees are entitled to return to their homeland. The importance of returning is 
reflected in the commonly used self-ascrip tion “returners” instead of the legal 
term “refugee” (see, Peteet 1998: p. 75). For the refugees it has been important to 
preserve their cultural unity and integrity in the “diaspora”, better described as a 
state of “alienated exile” (Ar. ghourba) that is qualitatively different from the 
Jewish experience ingrained in the term diaspora (Sayigh 1979).  
 
The refugees have in a number of ways sought out strategies for enduring in exile 
and surviving as a distinct ethnic group with a common history and future destiny. 
In order to create a symbolic continuity with the past, the refugees have organised 
space so that the camp’s quarters carry the names of the villages they left behind. 
This serves two purposes: it keeps the memory of the past alive and inscribes this 
imagery into the daily lives of the residents. This is also the case with story 
telling, narration and oral narratives which keep the memory of the homeland and 
the hardships in exile alive (see, Sayigh 1987, 1994, 1998). The importance of 
preserving their ethnic identity is also one reason for the prevalence of marriage 
endogamy. In addition, cultural activities are used to increase knowledge and 
appreciation of their cultural heritage, especially among the youth. This serves to 
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recreate and reaffirm Palestinian identity and uniqueness and as such the 
Palestinians in exile may be considered a moral community (Peteet 1998).  
 
Nonetheless, despite the constant struggle to resist marginalisation, the refugee 
community has not been able to prevent a shift from being considered “refugees”, 
a culturally significant label in the case of the Palestinians, to simply being an 
ethnic “minority” (see , Peteet 1996). Palestinian refugee identity is not only 
individual and social but to a large degree communal and political. The three 
pillars of Palestinian political activism in Lebanon are as follows: the provision of 
civic rights to the refugees, resisting naturalisation, locally referred to as 
“implantation” (Ar. tawteen), and upholding the “right of return” to their 
homeland/natal villages. These claims may at first glance seem contradictory. The  
refugees demand “civic rights”, that is the right to live and work in Lebanon, but 
do not seek citizenship (which, inter alia, includes the right to vote). This is 
because naturalisation would compromise the right of return and symbolically 
erase the Palestinian refugee community, as well as being construed as a victory 
for the Israeli authorities, who categorically reject the refugees’ “right of return”. 
Upholding the right of return is therefore a highly charged symbolic issue, 
especially for the older generation, and bridges past wrongdoings (forced exodus) 
with future redemption (returning to Palestine). Nonetheless, a large number of 
Palestinians have been naturalised in recent years. Since 1994 decrees by the 
Lebanese authorities have naturalised about 30,000 Palestinians, the majority of 
them from the former security zone to the south of the country (Peteet 1996: p. 
29).  
 
Despite efforts to prevent the disintegration of the refugee community, more than 
fifty years of tumultuous exile in Lebanon, which includes, to name but a few 
episodes, civil war (1975–90), factional conflict during the “war of the camps” 
(1982–87) and progressive economic marginalisation and exclusion in the post-
war decade, have taken their toll (see, U.S. Committee for Refugees 1999). In 
recent years there has been growing social discontent, disillusionment, despair and 
pent-up anger, especially among the youth (Ar. shebaab). Although a number of 
Palestinian NGOs provide vocational training for the youth, 5 it is inevitable that 
social problems earlier unheard of have now found their way into sections of the 
refugee community. This includes drug abuse, crime and prostitution, as well as 
the increased presence of Islamist groups in the refugee camps (see, Hammarberg 
2000: p. 12).  
Lebanese hosts 
Lebanon has been a reluctant host to the Palestinian refugees since 1948. A 
mainstay of Lebanese policies vis-à-vis the Palestinian refugees has been 
preventing their permanent integration and settlement in the country. Unlike other 
Arab countries such as Jordan and Syria, which also serve as hosts to Palestinian 
refugees, Lebanon did not grant the Palestinians civic rights and only a few were 
granted work permits (Shiblak 1997: 263). In recent years the Lebanese 
government has removed refugee privileges: in May 2001 the Lebanese 
government passed a law prohibiting Palestinians from buying property (Khalidi 
                                                 
5 Kasseem Aina, interview, 9 May 2003; Suikaina Salameh, interview, 6 May 2003. 
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2001: p. 17). However, the most extreme measure used to discriminate against 
Palestinians is preventing them from holding jobs and seeking higher education. 
Palestinians are barred from entering more than seventy high and low status 
professions so that they come to form a permanent underclass. To escape this fate 
a few have been able to obtain Lebanese citizenship although traditionally this has 
been condemned as unpatriotic (see, Sayigh 1995: p. 41). Recently, some 
Palestinians have left the country voluntarily so that the total number of refugees 
may now (unofficially) be around 200,000 (Ziade 2002: p. 57). 
  
The reasons for the Lebanese authorities’ policy of preventing naturalisation are a 
mix of foreign policy objectives demanding that Israel honour the refugees’ right 
of return and domestic pressures related to the country’s political system.6 
Lebanon is home to 25 different denominations which can broadly be fitted into 
two opposing ethno-religious blocs: Christians versus Muslims. Because of the 
precarious balance between Christians and Muslims, a nation-wide census has not 
been held since 1932 (Maktabi 1999). Instead, the results from the 1932 census 
are used to underwrite the current power-sharing between Christians and 
Muslims.7 This makes Lebanon’s consociational democracy very sensitive to the 
numerical balance between Christians and Muslims (Jabbra and Jabbra 2001).  
 
The Palestinian refugees, the majority of them Sunni Muslims, currently 
constitute about 10 per cent of Lebanon’s population (currently around 3.5 
million) which explains why naturalization of the refugees will upstage the 
precarious demographic and religious balance between Christians and Muslims as 
(as well as the balance between Sunni and Shia Muslims). Naturalisation of 
Palestinians in Lebanon is therefore considered a recipe for conflict between 
Christians and Muslims (el Khazen 1997). This has made the Lebanese suspicious 
of the Palestinians and many consider them a threat to the country’s stability 
(Nasrallah 1997). This view is shared among Christian and Muslim Lebanese 
communities alike (Azar and Mullet 2002).  
 
This is especially important as Lebanon is still struggling to overcome years of 
civil war that have caused political instability (Haddad 2002), economic turmoil 
(Norton 1999) and lingering tensions between the country’s multiple confessional 
identities (Johnson 2001). Since the ending of the civil war, Lebanon has to a 
considerable degree been able to put it s war-torn past behind it, but there are 
nonetheless growing tensions between Christians and Muslims and a resurgent 
sectarianism in present day Lebanon. This is especially poignant since Lebanon’s 
economic troubles have sharpened the conflict between Palestinians and the host 
population, many of whom blame the Palestinians for igniting the civil war. 
 
Lebanon is a middle income country with huge income disparities. The macro-
economic framework favours the tertiary service sector, in particular banking, 
which is the cornerstone of the country’s rentier economy. 8 Rebuilding the 
country has incurred large costs and failed economic policies have left the country 
                                                 
6 Khalil Shatawi, interview, Beirut, 13 May 2003. 
7 Without a nationwide census the size of confessional groups is uncertain but informed guesses 
suggest that the “Muslims” (Shia, Sunni, Druze) constitute about 58 per cent of the population and 
the “Christians” (Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics etc.) about 42 per cent. 
8 Antoine Haddad, interview , Beirut, 13 May 2003.  
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heavily indebted (Norton 1999). The country’s stagnant economy is now 
burdened with a debt of US$ 31 billion (180 per cent of GDP). Debt servicing 
alone amounts to US$ 3 billion annually. Recent studies of living conditions in 
Lebanon show that about one third of the population is below the poverty line 
(MoASA and UNDP 1998).9 More troubling still is the fact that income 
disparities appear to be correlated with confessional identities: poor and Muslim 
and rich and Christian. Overall, Muslim majority areas to the south (Shia), the east 
(Shia) and the north (Sunni) are the country’s poorest.10 There are indications that 
the economic downturn and widespread poverty has reinforced Islamist 
sentiments among Sunni and Shia Muslims and increased support for alternative, 
Islamist forms of government. In particular, the poverty stricken rural areas with a 
Muslim majority population have turned to confessional parties for assistance in a 
context of low government investment and neglect (Haddad 2002: p. 215). The 
Palestinian refugees are Lebanon’s most impoverished and disenfranchised 
community: an important question is, therefore, whether there are concurrent 
processes of Islamisation among them too.  
 
A useful starting point for examining this question is Suleiman’s (1999) study of 
political actors in Ayn Hilwa (a.k.a., ‘Ayn al-Hilwa, Ein el-Hilweh), a refugee 
camp on the outskirts of the coastal port Sidon in southern Lebanon. Ayn Hilwa is 
not only the biggest but also the most conflict-ridden camp in the country, with 
frequent skirmishes between political factions. Suleiman provides a detailed 
overview of the politically active groups in Ayn Hilwa, which can be split into 
three main categories: loyalist, Islamist and oppositional (Table 2). The “loyalists” 
are secular groups formed around PLO’s largest faction Fateh and share its secular 
ideology and political programme. The “Islamists” are a heterogeneous mix of 
Palestinian and Lebanese Islamists with divergent ideologies and political 
agendas. While some remain ideologically opposed to Fateh and its policies vis-à-
vis Israel (Hamas, Islamic Jihad), others seek to break Fateh’s political hegemony 
in Lebanese refugee camps, if necessary by violent means (Osbat al-Ansar). The 
“oppositional” camp is likewise a heterogeneous coalition of secular parties, many 
of them breakaway factions from Fateh itself, which find a common ground in 
their difference with Fateh and the loyalists over their policy of appeasement vis-
à-vis Israel. In the camps there is also a diverse range of committees and groups 
whose main function is not political but bureaucratic. Still, control of the popular 
committees and trade union groups does provide political gains and leadership of 
them is therefore coveted and sometimes turns violent. As shown by Suleiman, 
the political situation in the camps is premised on internal battles over political 
hegemony of the camp itself, and external policy differences over the Palestinian 
nationalist struggle.   
 
Suleiman’s article demonstrates that Islamist groups are politically significant in 
Palestinian refugee camps and gives important insights into the composition of 
political groups and actors. 11 However, there is no further discussion of why and 
                                                 
9 A poverty line for Lebanon has not been computed due to its sensitive political implications. The 
report therefore adopted an indirect measure of poverty known as “unsatisfied basic needs” (Jerve 
2001).   
10 Adib Nehme, interview, Beirut, 14 May 2003. 
11 Although this survey refers to a single camp, Suleiman argues that the findings are applicable to 
all camps in southern Lebanon, but differs from camps in Beirut and to the north (ibid.: 77). There 
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how they have come to enjoy this position. To do that, we need more details of the 
groups or their ideology, which are necessary to understand the reasons behind the 
support for various Islamists groups among Palestinian refugees.  
 
Table 2 
Political actors in a Lebanese refugee camp (Ayn Hilwa) 
Loyalist Islamist Oppositional 
Fateh Hamas  Palestinian National Alliance *  
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) Islamic Jihad 
Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PLFs)** 
People’s Party (Communist) 
Islamic Group (Jamaa al-
Islamiyya) 
Democratic Front for Liberation 
of Palestine (DFLP)** 
Palestinian Popular Struggle 
Front (PPSF) 
Islamic Philanthropic 
Association (al-Abash) [Trade Union Groups]  
Arab Liberation Front (ALF) Ansar Group  [Village Committees]  
 Miscellaneous Islamist Groups [Popular Committees] 
* Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), Fateh-Intifadah, Sa’eka, 
Palestine Liberation Front, Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), Revolutionary Communist Party, Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad.    
** PFLP and DFLP, both leftist secular parties, oscillate between the opposition and the loyalist (Fateh) camp. 
Source: Compiled from Suleiman (1999, pp. 72-76) 
 
Lebanese Islamism  
Lebanon is a small country with a large number of ethnic and religious minorities, 
hence it is not a country which gives rise to powerful Islamist groups. Thus, most 
Islamist groups in Lebanon are offshoots of movements originating outside the 
country, in particular Egypt and Syria (Sunni groups), as well as Iran (Shia 
groups) (Khashan 1998: p. 225). Among the first studies of Islamism in Lebanon 
was Marius Deeb’s (1986) overview of militant Sunni groups. Deeb argued that 
the Iranian revolution, Syrian sponsorship, the Israeli invasion of southern 
Lebanon as well as the economic crisis were the main reasons for the formation of 
Islamist groups after 1980 (ibid: p. 2-3). In post-war Lebanon, there has been a 
steady growth of fringe Islamist groups; there are now more than twenty Islamist 
groups and parties in the country (see, 1997, 1998, Hamzeh 2001b, Khashan 
1998). They can be divided broadly into either “quietist” (activists) or “militant” 
(Hamzeh 1998) but in practice this dichotomy is too rigid.12 In Lebanon there are 
many examples of Islamist groups starting out as “quietist” which later engage in 
political violence. There are also examples of the opposite; that is, groups starting 
out as “militant” later embrace power by the ballot box. In order to capture the 
diversity of Islamist groups, this paper divides them into four different types: 
“mainstream” (Hizbollah, Jamaa al-Islamiyya), “quietist” (Al Abash), “militant” 
(Hamas, Islamic Jihad) and “revolutionary” (Takfir wa al-Hijra, Osbat al-Ansar). 
The “mainstream” and “quietist” groups remain wedded to national concerns in 
Lebanon and take only a cursory interest in the Palestinian cause as such. Not so 
                                                                                                                                     
the camps are under the control of the opposition groups rather than the PLO loyalists and there 
are no rival Fateh committees. The northern camps (Beddawi, Nahr al-Bared) also manifest 
significant activity by the Lebanese Sunni Islamist groups such as al-Abash (Islamic Philanthropic 
Association) and the Islamic Group (Jamaa al-Islamiyya) as well as minor groups such as the 
Islamic Liberation Party, the Daw‘ah party and Wahabi groups. 
12 A. Nizar Hamzeh, interview, Beirut, 16 May 2003. 
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with the two militant Palestinian groups (Hamas and Islamic Jihad): to them all 
political goals are secondary to liberating Palestine. The “revolutionary” groups 
engage in guerrilla warfare in order to turn Lebanon into an Islamic state. Using 
Palestinian refugee camps as a base for their activities, they are involved in a 
bloody vendetta with rival political factions. While groups such as Hizbollah 
(Hamzeh 2000, Ranstorp 1994, Saad-Ghorayeb 2002), Hamas (Mishal and Sela 
2000) and Islamic Jihad (Abu-Amr 1994) have been studied in detail, the 
membership and ideology of the clandestine and revolutionary groups are veiled 
in secrecy (but see, Hamzeh 1998, Khashan 1998).  
Mainstream 
Hizbollah  
It is impossible to understand the growth of Islamism in Lebanon without 
considering the role of Hizbollah (Party of God), the most influential of the 
Islamist parties, which was founded in 1982. Hizbollah defies easy categorisation 
and is both a political party and a resistance movement. Hizbollah has since the 
beginning been strongly opposed to Israel and the organisation scored a major 
victory when its fighters forced an Israeli withdrawal from the southern security 
zone, which had been occupied by Israeli forces assisted by Lebanese militia, the 
South Lebanese Army (SLA), since 1982 (Murdon 2000). Hizbollah has 
demonstrated not only its military prowess, but also its political acumen. 
Underlining the fluency of labels such as “militant” and “quietist”, Hizbollah has 
since the Taif Accords remade itself from a militant organisation into a major 
democratic force and vocal mouthpiece for the Lebanese Shia (Hamzeh 2000). 
Hizbollah has in recent years reoriented its political goals towards an Islamic 
nationalism and process that has been termed “Lebanonization” (Ranstrop 1998). 
The reorientation of Hizbollah has been problematic and has led to clerical 
factionalism inside the organisation, including the ouster of Sheikh Nasrallah’s 
opponent Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli (ibid.). 
  
Hizbollah stayed outside the devastating “war of the camps” which pitted 
Palestinian factions against each other and the Syria-backed Amal militia. This 
fact, together with Hizbollah’s strongly anti-Israeli stance, is one of the reasons 
why the organisation enjoys close relations with the Palestinian refugee 
community and its leaders.13 Hizbollah’s main constituency is the Lebanese Shia, 
but the organisation also provides social welfare to Palestinian refugees. In the 
dilapidated Shatila camp, for example, Hizbollah provides residents with potable 
water and supplies diesel for the run-down power generators. Hizbollah’s leader 
Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has on various occasions supported Palestinians’ claims 
to civil rights but without committing the organisation itself to this goal (Sayigh 
2001: p. 103). Nonetheless, there are limitations to how far the organisation can 
embrace Palestinian political aspirations without alienating its Shia constituency, 
which remains the organisation’s power base. Nonetheless, Hizbollah’s 
pragmatism and willingness to compromise has seen its influence grow beyond its 
narrow confessional constituency. Through alliances with secular and Christian 
                                                 
13 The Shia Amal Movement has been left out in this overview because it does not attract 
Palestinian supporters or sympathisers, see (Deeb 1988).  
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Lebanese parties, Hizbollah has been able to win several seats in municipal 
elections and in 1996 won seven out of 128 parliamentary seats (Hamzeh 2000). 
 
Hizbollah supports social welfare programmes on a very large scale, running 
subsidised hospitals, schools and housing schemes, which in many areas eclipse 
those provided by the state (Hamzeh 1998: p. 263). This has led to Hizbollah 
rivalling the government in the Shia-dominated parts of Beirut, southern Lebanon, 
and the Bekaa valley, where it is the de facto government (see, Hamzeh 1994). 
Hizbollah has also been able to circumvent the traditional patron-client networks 
zu‘ama, networks formerly controlled by an urban-based merchant elite of 
political bosses (Ar. za‘im, pl. zu‘ama) (Johnson 1985, 1996). The civil war 
disrupted these networks and replaced zu‘ama clientelism with a new and more 
complex mix of clientelist networks developed around militias, parties and 
Islamist groups such as Hizbollah (see, Hamzeh 2001a). This has enabled the 
organisation to compete successfully in municipal elections. The organisation’s 
success has served as an inspiration for smaller and less important Islamist 
groups, which seek to emulate Hizbollah strategies. 
Jamaa al-Islamiyya 
The Jamaa al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) is an urban-based Sunni Islamist 
movement founded in Tripoli in 1964 and today operating primarily in Sunni 
majority areas such as Tripoli, Sidon and Akkar. The group advocates the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon and has called for a holy war (al-
jihad al-muqaddas) against Israel. Unlike Osbat al-Ansar, the Jamaa reconciled 
itself with the Taif Accords which ended the civil war (1975–90) and established 
Lebanon’s Second Republic. The organisation took part in the first parliamentary 
elections in 1992 and won three seats, and just one seat in 1996 (Hamzeh 1998). 
Like its larger Shia counterpart Hizbollah, the Jamaa is also engaged in providing 
social welfare but on a much more modest scale.   
 
The Jamaa’s ideology is influenced by radical Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid 
Qutb (1900–66) and his follower, Fathi Yakan, a native of Tripoli and member of 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (Hamzeh 1997). The Jamaa’s political activism is 
marked by being opposed to the traditional Sunni establishment of political and 
religious leaders. The organization has also been involved in fights with moderate 
Sunni groups espousing a spiritual (“quietist”) ideology such as aAl Abash and 
Harakat at-Tawhid al-Islami (The Islamic Unity Movement). 
 
There are indications that the economic downturn in Tripoli and its rural 
hinterland (Akkar region) has reinforced Islamist sentiments and grown support 
for such Sunni Islamist groups as the Jamaa. This coincides with the fact that the 
lack of government services has increased the support for alternative forms of 
government (Haddad 2002: p. 215). As shown above the Jama‘a is a Sunni 
Islamist organisation whose objectives can be likened to that of Hizbollah, that is, 
Islamist nationalism. Like Hizbollah, the Jama‘a has embraced power through the 
ballot box and with the help of joining mixed coalition lists has secured votes 
outside Sunni majority municipalities (Hamzeh 2000).     
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Quietist 
al-Abash  
The al-Abash is an untypical Islamist group whose doctrines, political ideology 
and non-violent stance set it apart from other groups. The group blends Sufism 
with elements of Sunni and Shii theology and may be termed charismatic because 
of the personal devotion members have to the group’s founder, Sheikh Abdallah 
al-Abdari (also known as al-Abashi). The group is commonly referred to as Al 
Abash (“the Ethiopian”), because of al-Abdari’s Ethiopian origins. After being 
expelled from Ethiopia in 1947, al-Abdari eventually settled in Beirut in 1950. He 
took over the leadership of the movement in 1983. By the end of the civil war, 
aggressive proselytization (uncommon among Sufi orders) swelled the group’s 
ranks to become one of Lebanon’s largest Islamic movements (Hamzeh and 
Dekmejian 1996) and in 1992 the organisation won one seat in the parliamentary 
elections. Because of its pro-Syrian and pro-Western stance, the al-Abash has 
been targeted by rival Islamist groups, in particular the Jamaa al-Islamiyya (The 
Islamic Group). In 1995, following many bloody clashes between al-Abash and 
the Islamic Group, Sheikh Nizar al-Halabi, the al-Abash president, was killed by 
unknown assailants (ibid.).  
 
The spectacular rise of al-Abash is particularly interesting given the fact that most 
Islamist groups espouse a Wahabi ideology and adamantly reject Sufism. Al-
Abdari and his followers also condemn the use of political violence, including the 
violence committed by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots 
in the Middle East. Importantly, the movement also rejects the goal common to 
Islamists of all persuasions: the creation of an Islamic state, as well as jihad as a 
means to achieve this goal (ibid.). Additionally, the movement rejects the 
argument inherent in Sayyid Qutb’s notion of jahiliyya, a Quranic term which 
refers to the pre-Islamic condition, combining ignorance and savagery. Taken to 
its logical conclusion, Qutb’s radical views legitimised internecine killings among 
Muslims.14 In sum, the al-Abash is a (predominantly) non-violent, spiritualist 
movement which preaches moderation and tolerance. In al-Abash teachings and 
literature there is no special reference to Palestinians or Palestinian rights except 
support for UN Resolution 245 demanding an end to the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank and Gaza (ibid.).   
Militant  
Hamas 
Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya) was founded in 1987 shortly after the 
first Palestinian uprising (intifada) broke out (Hroub 2000, Mishal and Sela 2000). 
The goals and ideology of Hamas are inscribed into the organisation’s charter 
(Hamas 1988) and can briefly be summarised as ending Israeli occupation by the 
use of force (in the form of a jihad) to establish a Palestinian state in all of 
Mandatory Palestine. Hamas is often portrayed purely as a militant organisation, 
                                                 
14 Qutb and the Islamists following in his footsteps argued that current Muslim societies had 
reverted to jahiliyya and must be defeated (through a jihad) in order to re-establish divine rule 
(hakimiyya). Qutb argued that where jahilyyia prevailed, the members of society were no longer 
Muslims (takfir, “impious”) and could legitimately be killed (see, Knudsen 2003). 
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but in reality the organisation is better described as pragmatic. This pragmatism is 
borne out of the fact that “one who aspires to lead the Palestinian nationalist 
movement, has to be pragmatic”. 15 Hamas also prides itself on its credibility 
among the Palestinian people, due, in part, to the organisation’s transparency. 
Hamas endorses the use of violence, including suicide attacks, but the 
organisation stresses that it only targets Jews in Israel and never attacks Jews 
outside the country. Although Hamas favours an Islamic state in Palestine, their 
first priority is to Islamise the society. Hamas rejects negotiations with Israel, 
considering this as tantamount to recognising the Israeli state. Hamas’s political 
goals are narrowly linked to liberating Palestine by all means available. The 
organisation does not have a political manifesto aimed at the refugees except 
sharing the three goals common to Islamist and secular groups alike: civic rights 
for refugees, resisting naturalisation and upholding the refugees’ “right of return”. 
Local spokesmen for Hamas see their presence in Lebanon as an integral part of 
the Palestinian people’s nationalist struggle but are vague about details of the 
movement’s history and activities in Lebanon. Hamas does not recruit members 
for the Palestinian intifadah from Lebanon, but provides its trademark social 
services and social welfare for the refugees. As on the West Bank and Gaza, the 
social work of Hamas is a major reason for the grassroots support the organisation 
enjoys in Lebanese refugee camps.  
Islamic Jihad 
Islamic Jihad (i.e., Palestinian Islamic Jihad) was founded around 1979–80 as an 
outgrowth of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. The main pillars of the 
organisation’s philosophy can be summarised as “Islam, Palestine and jihad”.16 
There are subtle ideological differences between Islamic Jihad and Hamas: the 
former tends towards a more universal application of jihad, while Hamas has 
adopted a more nationalist interpretation of jihad, restricting the term to armed 
resistance against Israel (Milton-Edwards 1992). Compared to Hamas, Islamic 
Jihad tends to be more violent and, possibly due to its pan-Arabic orientation, 
places less importance on providing social services. Nonetheless, in Lebanon the 
organisation is engaged in social activities and runs cultural clubs, clinics and 
kindergartens in the camps. However, due to its weaker funding, it is less involved 
in charitable activities than its more influential counterpart Hamas (see, JPS 1999: 
p. 68). This may be one reason why Islamic Jihad has seen its support wane in 
recent years and its supporters shift their allegiance to Hamas. Like Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad is a movement rather than a party and the group’s support among 
the refugees cannot easily be measured. As with Hamas, local spokesmen for the 
organisation do not offer detailed information on the group’s history and activities 
in Lebanon. 
Revolutionary 
Takfir wa al-Hijra 
Takfir wa al-Hijra (Redemption and Flight) is a militant group which was founded 
in 1996 by Bassam Ahnmed Kanj (a.k.a. Abu A’isha), a Lebanese educated in the 
                                                 
15 Abu Ahmed Fadl (Hamas), interview, Ayn Hilwa 15 May 2003. 
16 Shakib (Islamic Jihad), interview, Ayn Hilwa, 17 May 2003. 
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US.17 By the end of the 1980s he had become involved with fundraising for the 
Afghan mujaheddin and moved to Pakistan for a year, where he met many of 
those who later became key figures in the close-knit movement. The group was 
aided by donations from foreign associates; these were used to purchase arms 
supposedly provided by a former head of Hizbollah, the rebellious Sheikh Subhi 
al-Tufayli. The group subsequently established a camp in the Dinniyeh mountains 
east of Tripoli in order to provide military and ideological training to followers.18 
According to reports, the group’s core was Lebanese but also included a 
significant number of Palestinians and Syrians as well as other Arab nationalities. 
There the group, now numbering perhaps 200–300 men, developed plans to 
establish an Islamic “mini-state”, later to be extended to all of Lebanon. The 
doctrine of the movement is influenced by Wahabism, and the group’s ultimate 
goal was to establish a united “State of Islam” in the Arab world with the same 
Caliphate government system that the Prophet Mohammed instituted. The group’s 
name is a reflection of its ideological links to the militant Islamic group of the 
same name (al-Takfir wa al-Hijra), which emerged from the ranks of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood in the mid-1970s (see, Abu-Amr 1993: p.8).   
 
The Lebanese authorities took little notice of this clandestine group until they 
allegedly bombed Orthodox Churches in and around Tripoli in October and 
November 1999. At that time, the Syrian authorities were busy hunting down 
Islamic militants. The manhunt spilled over to Lebanon and the Lebanese 
authorities were instructed to take action against the Dinniyeh militants. In early 
January 2000 a unit of 15,000 Lebanese soldiers attacked the rebel bases with 
heavy artillery and tanks. About twenty-five rebels were killed, including the 
leader Bassam Kanj, and about fifty-five arrested. The remaining militants fled to 
southern Lebanon where they sought refuge in the Ayn Hilwa refugee camp. Now 
referred to as the “Dinniyeh Group”, they were shielded by members of Osbat al-
Noor. Members of the group were eventually persuaded by mediators to leave the 
camp of their own accord, but it is not known whether they gave themselves up to 
the authorities or remain fugitives.  
Osbat al-Ansar (a.k.a. Ansar Group) 
Osbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans) is a loosely organized Sunni group 
espousing a Wahabi ideology. 19 The organisation was founded in 1985 by Sheikh 
Hisham Shreidi. In the 1980s Shreidi had been a senior leader of the Lebanese 
Islamist group Jamaa al-Islamiyya. The group consists of both Palestinian and 
Lebanese members and its main power bases are the refugee camps Ayn Hilwa in 
Sidon and Nahr al-Bared outside Tripoli. 
                                                 
17 Takfir wa al-Hijra is a clandestine group about which little is known. The information here has 
been collected from various on-line sources such as the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 
www.meib.org/articles/0001_l1.htm, www.meib.org/articles/0109_l1.htm. 
18 In the 1970s, the Dinniyeh region was one of the bases of the Islamic Group’s (Jamaa) militias 
(Deeb 1986: p.5).  
19 Osbat al-Ansar is a clandestine group about which little is known. The information about the 
group has been collected from various net-based sources, including al-Ahram Weekly, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/431/re4.htm, the Lebanese Foundation for Peace, www.free-
lebanon.com/LFPNews/August_2002/August9/august9.html#_1_2, the Center for Defence 
Information, www.cdi.org/terrorism/asbat.cfm and the US Department of State’s Patterns of 
Global Terrorism 2003: Middle East, www.state.gov/documents/organization/20115.pdf.  
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In 1991 Shreidi was assassinated on the orders of Amin Kayid, then the 
commander of Yasser Arafat’s Fateh movement in Ayn Hilwa. Shreidi was 
succeeded by his chief aide Ahmad Abd al-Karim al-Saadi, better known by his 
nom de guerre Abu Mohjen, who reshaped the group’s ideology and sharpened its 
political aspirations. In the early 1990s, Osbat al-Ansar bombed nightclubs, 
theatres and liquor stores throughout Lebanon. Since then, the group has come 
into conflict with rival Palestinian and Islamist groups operating in and around 
Sidon. In 1995 members of the group killed Nizar Al Halabi, the leader of al-
Abash, a rival Islamist group. Three Ansar members were convicted and 
subsequently executed for the murder of Halabi. In 1996 Abu Mohjen was 
sentenced to death in absentia for ordering the assassination. The whereabouts of 
Abu Mohjen are unknown but some sources claim he is hiding inside Ayn Hilwa.  
 
Currently, Osbat al-Ansar is split into four different factions. 20 The mainstream 
faction is Osbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans) which is headed by Abu Mohjen’s 
brother, Haitam Abdul Karim Al Saadi (a.k.a. Abu Tarek). The major breakaway 
faction is Osbat al-Noor (League of Enlightenment), which is headed by Sheikh 
Abdullah Shreidi, the elder son of the founder of Osbat al-Ansar, Sheikh Hisham 
Shreidi. Shreidi junior claims that his father never authorized Abu Tarek to lead 
the Osbat al-Ansar group, which may be one reason for the formation of Osbat al-
Noor. 
 
In 2002, fighting broke out between Osbat al-Ansar and Osbat al-Noor. The 
reason for this was a row over extradition of the Lebanese Islamist Badi Hamadeh 
(a.k.a. Abu Obeidah), who in July the same year killed three government soldiers 
who tried to arrest him in Sidon. Following this incident Hamadeh sought refuge 
in Ayn Hilwa, where he was shielded by members of Osbat al-Noor and activists 
from the Dinniyeh Group (see this below). The deadlock was broken when a 
Sidon cleric, Sheikh Maher Hammoud, with help from the mainstream Osbat al-
Ansar, seized Hamadeh and delivered him to the Lebanese authorities waiting at 
the entrance of the camp. This incident put Osbat al-Ansar at odds with Osbat al-
Noor. In a statement released to the press shortly after, Osbat al-Noor threatened 
to turn “Ayn Hilwa and the whole of Lebanon into a pool of blood” should there 
be further attempts at extraditing members of the Dinniyeh Group.21 They also 
charged Sheikh Hammoud with “betrayal” and shortly afterwards a bomb was 
found planted near the rostrum in the al-Qud’s mosque where Hammoud 
delivered his sermons. 
 
Currently, Osbat al-Ansar draws its members from three different groups: the 
clansmen of Abu Mohjen, Palestinians from various Lebanese refugee camps, and 
fighters who staged an uprising in the Dinniyeh mountains near Tripoli in January 
2002 (see, below Dinniyeh Group). The group has, it is claimed, links to terrorist 
groups such as al-Qaeda and for this reason was put on the US Government list of 
foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) in 2002 (US Department of State 2002). 
                                                 
20 The two minor splinter groups are Osbat al-Ansar – Emergency Bureau which is headed by Abu 
Mohjen’s military commander Abu Obeida, and a group which carries the name of the mainstream 
group and is led by Imad Yassin, wanted by Lebanese authorities on a spate of criminal charges 
involving bombings and attacks.  
21 Middle East Online, 7 August 2022, www.meo.tv/English/?id=2127. 
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The group’s stronghold is the refugee camps Ayn Hilwa near Sidon and Nahr el 
Bared outside Tripoli. In Ayn Hilwa, Osbat al-Ansar has become a formidable 
challenge to Fateh’s political hegemony. Since the tit-for-tat killings in the 1990s, 
the groups have been locked in a bloody vendetta. In May 1999 the Fateh official 
Amin Kayed was killed in a drive-by shooting and his aide Jamal Dayekh lost 
both legs in a booby-trapped car in Sidon. No one took responsibility for these 
attacks, but it is widely believed that Kayed was killed to avenge the murder of 
Osbat al-Ansar’s founder, Sheikh Hisham Shreidi. In June the same year the 
group stood accused of killing four Sidon judges, most likely in revenge for the 
executions of three of Ansar’s members in 1997.  
  
In March 2003, a remote controlled bomb killed Abu Mohammed Al Masri,  
claimed to be one of the leaders of the splinter faction Osbat al-Noor. This 
incident sparked new clashes between the Ansar factions and Fateh with a new 
series of attacks and ambushes which killed two people (one of them Sheikh 
Abdulla Shreidi’s relative, Ibrahim Shreidi) and injured the leader of Osbat al-
Noor, Sheikh Abdulla Shreidi who later died from his injuries. On May 17th more 
serious armed clashes broke out between Fateh and what was probably a united 
group of fighters from Osbat al-Ansar and Osbat al-Noor. 22 The total death toll in 
this incident was seven killed, all of them Fateh soldiers, and more than twenty 
wounded. Currently, there is a lull in the fighting and the parties to the conflict 
have signed a ceasefire agreement.23 Still, there is no doubt that sooner rather than 
later, this will set off a new round of tit-for-tat killings.  
Secular nationalist groups  
In order to assess the influence of Islamist groups, it is also necessary to examine 
the role of secular parties and groups which compete with the Islamists for 
political hegemony and influence with the refugee population. The groups are all 
widely studied and therefore a short summary of their history and goals will 
suffice.  
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was founded in 1964 as a 
Palestinian nationalist umbrella organisation dedicated to the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state. The biggest PLO faction, Fateh, was founded by 
Yasser Arafat, who since 1969 has been PLO’s chairman. Fateh is the leading 
organization of the Palestinian resistance.24 Fateh is the largest, oldest and best 
organised of the political movements and has offices and representatives in most 
camps in Lebanon, especially in the camps to the south. The organisation is also 
better funded and therefore able to underwrite social welfare programmes which 
are larger than those of their political rivals.25 Like the other secular and religious 
political organisations, Fateh campaigns for civic rights for the refugees, resists 
implantation (“tawteen”) and upholds the “right of return”. The reason for the 
                                                 
22 BBC News Online, 19 May 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3041451.stm. 
23 Middle East Online, 20 May 2003, http://www.meo.tv/english/Default.pl?id=5626. 
24 Fateh, which literally means victory or conquest, is also a reverse acronym of Harakat al-Tahrir 
al-Watani al-Filastini, Palestinian National Liberation Movement. 
25 Fathi H. Abou El Ardaat (PLO), interview, Ayn Hilwa, 15 June 2003.  
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secular opposition group’s falling out with Fateh is that unlike the opposition 
groups, Fateh and the PLO seek a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem and 
support a two-state solution with borders to be established after negotiations. In 
order to accomplish this, PLO abrogated its charter, which could be summarised 
as the “three nos” – no recognition, no negotiation and no peace with Israel. 
Abrogating the charter turned these into “three yeses” – recognising the state of 
Israel, a negotiated settlement and peace between two nations. The high point of 
this policy was the negotiated solution to the Palestine problem known as the Oslo 
Accords signed by PLO and Israel in 1993. The main criticism of the Oslo 
Accords was that it was a sell-out and handed large parts of Mandatory Palestine 
to the Israelis with only empty promises to the Palestinians (see, JPS 1999). 
Moreover, the accords and the Declaration of Principles (DOP) did not resolve the 
refugees’ rights of return and increased fears that in the end the rights would be 
compromised (Milton-Edwards 1996b: p. 207). This, together with the Palestinian 
uprising (intifadah), marked a growing opposition inside the PLO and criticism of 
its leader Yasser Arafat. Nonetheless, despite the criticism of Fateh and PLO, the 
organisation does have a loyal following in Lebanon, who prefer PLO’s secular 
pragmatism to the opposition’s Islamism.    
 
While Fateh does not endorse political violence, it has nonetheless been involved 
in a bloody vendetta with political rivals, in particular fringe Islamist groups such 
as Osbat al-Ansar and Osbat al-Noor. Fateh seeks to uproot the organisation and 
has repeatedly targeted its leaders, including the recent attack which injured Osbat 
al-Noor’s leader Sheikh Abdulla Shreidi and two of his bodyguards. Fateh’s 
leader in Lebanon, Sultan Abul Aynain, took responsibility for the attack and said 
that Fateh had been “forced to decide Shreidi’s fate” and accused him of 
terrorising the Ayn Hilwa refugee camp.26  
Palestinian National Alliance (PNA)  
In Lebanon, Fateh is opposed by an alliance of secular opposition groups which 
includes secular parties, militias and splinter groups whose main difference with 
Fateh is the ir policies vis-à-vis Israel. The Palestinian National Alliance (PNA) 
competes with Fateh and Islamists for the ideological leadership of the Palestinian 
nationalist cause. They can collectively be labelled “absolutist” or “maximalist” 
because they reject the Oslo Agreement, demand full withdrawal from the 
Occupied Territories, refuse to accept the state of Israel and reject negotiations 
and support armed struggle against Israel. They include leftist parties such as 
PFLP and its breakaway twin, the DFLP, Sa’iqa (an offshoot of the Syrian al-
Baath party), militias such as PFLP-GC (a breakaway from PFLP in 1968), minor 
splinter groups such as the Palestine Liberation Front (split from PFLP-GC in 
1976), Fateh-Intifadah (split from Fateh in 1983), the Palestinian Popular Struggle 
Front (PPSF) (founded in 1967), and militant groups such as the clandestine 
Fateh-Revolutionary Council (a.k.a. Abu Nidal Group).27 All these groups are 
pro-Syrian and depend on Syrian sponsorship and political support. Currently, 
three of the groups (PFLP, PFLP-GC and Fateh Revolutionary Council) have been 
                                                 
26 Middle East Online, 19 May 2003, www.meo.tv/english/Default.pl?id=5617. 
27 The details of the history, leadership and ideology of the secular opposition groups falls beyond 
the scope of this paper, whose main concern is the Islamist groups, but see, (Cobban 1992) and  
MidEast Web, www.mideastweb.org/palestianparties.htm.  
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put on the US list of foreign terrorist organisation (FTOs) (US Department of 
State 2002).   
 
The groups are all secular in outlook but have formed a loose coalition with 
Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which also oppose the Oslo 
Accords and authorise the use of violence to liberate Mandatory Palestine. This 
ten-member coalition was formerly known as the Coalition of Ten Contingents, 
but after the withdrawal of DFLP in 1997 has been known as the Palestinian 
National Alliance (PNA) (Suleiman 1999).28 The clandestine Abu Nidal Group 
has remained unaligned and is not a member of the alliance. There is close 
operational cooperation between the secular and Islamist opposition groups so that 
PFLP-GC bases have been used to train Hamas and Islamic Jihad supporters and 
the PFLP-GC has been a major conduit of arms supplies to Islamic Jihad and 
Hamas in Palestine (Gambill 2002). The particularity of the Lebanese diaspora 
situation has brought Islamists and secular groups together under the banner of 
Palestinian nationalism. In Ayn Hilwa, the mainstream Islamist groups (Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad) and the secular opposition groups (DFLP, PFLP) enjoy close 
relations. The  leaders of the secular parties liken this to a triangle: in one corner 
are the Islamists, in the second the secular nationalist movement (Fateh) and in the 
third the democrats (DFLP, PFLP). “This is a healthy division – this is 
democracy”, they maintain.29  
 
The secular opposition groups share the goal of creating a Palestinian state, but 
differ on the means to achieve this goal. Unlike Fateh and PLO, they support 
armed struggle for liberating Palestine and reject negotiated settlements which 
relinquish cla ims to all of Mandatory Palestine (such as the Oslo Accords). This 
puts them at odds with the policies of Fateh and the PLO loyalists as well as their 
local political hegemony in some of the refugee camps. Nonetheless, the secular 
opposition groups have shied away from political violence as a means to end the 
political hegemony and leadership of Fateh and PLO in Lebanese refugee camps. 
Conclusion  
The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are doubly marginalised: they are deprived 
of civic rights and barred from returning to their homeland. Exiled in Lebanon, 
the refugees suffer from social and political marginalisation that leaves them 
disillusioned and frustrated. Can this explain the gradual radicalisation of the 
refugee community, expressed as increased support for militant Islamist groups? 
The conventional approaches to explaining the Islamic “resurgence” or “revival” 
in the Middle East (see overview in, Knudsen 2003) argue that it is fuelled by 
social and political discontent. The Palestinian Islamist revival in Gaza and the 
West Bank was a local response to the regional Islamist revival that after 1982 
took the form of a political challenge to PLO and the secularisation of Palestinian 
society (Milton-Edwards 1996a: p. 8). It was not, however, simply a result of 
political discontent with Fateh and the PLO. Is this also the case for the rise of 
Islamist sentiments among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon? This paper suggests 
                                                 
28 Interviews were carried out with members of the alliance, including Marwan Abul Al (PFLP), 
Suheil Natour (DFLP), Abu Hani (PFLP-GC), Abu Ali Hassan (Sa’eka), Abu Fadi Hammound 
(Fateh-Intifadah), Abu Ahmed Fadl (Hamas) and Shakib (Islamic Jihad). 
29 Marwan Abd’ul  Al (PFLP), interview, Mar Elias, 12 May 2003. 
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that the rise of Islamism is a complex mix of contingent factors that is fuelled by 
social and political deprivation and shaped by divergent views on Palestinian 
nationalism (secular vs. Islamist), the Islamist revival in Lebanon and also what 
could be termed “strategic localisation” that turns refugee camps into battlefields 
between Palestinian factions. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the 
majority of the refugees appear weary of politics and disinclined to join Islamist 
movements. Their main concern is to protect Palestinian identity and remain loyal 
to the nationalist struggle to liberate their homeland.  
 
The most striking feature of Palestinian political activism in Lebanon is its 
fragmentation. Both among the secular and Islamist lobbies we find a plethora of 
smaller and larger groups, often with conflicting views and sometimes involved in 
fratricidal battles that weaken the refugee community and ultimately undermine 
their quest for political hegemony. None of them are able to speak on behalf of the 
whole refugee community and this serves to “compartmentalise” and therefore 
weaken the Palestinian nationalist struggle to regain their homeland. Unlike the 
Shia Hizbollah, the Islamist groups cater for narrowly defined segments of the 
refugee population and have been unable to attract wider support. Instead, they 
cater for minor, camp-based constituencies which compete with secular groups for 
internal control of the camps and, by implication, of the Palestinian nationalist 
cause itself. This is especially the case for “revolutionary groups” such as Osbat 
al-Ansar and its offshoots, which are engaged in bloody turf war with Fateh over 
local leadership in the Ayn Hilwa refugee camp. However, the strength of the 
Islamist groups varies from camp to camp, reflecting the turmoil following the 
PLO’s departure from Lebanon in 1983 and the divisions that followed the 
signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. This pitted Fateh “loyalists” against 
Islamists and secular opposition groups, although open violence did not break out. 
The support for Islamist groups could therefore be interpreted as a reaction against 
the policies of Fateh and PLO which spills over into internal battles in the refugee 
camps. The support for the two “militant” Palestinian Islamist groups, Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad, suggests that to a segment of the refugee population at least, 
Islamism is linked to nationalist sentiments that include defeating Israel and 
liberating all of Mandatory Palestine. However, the political goals of Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad are shared by a number of competing secular parties and movements 
and cannot therefore be a rallying point for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. 
 
Lebanon is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country with a Muslim majority 
population. This has given rise to a plethora of Islamist movements which are a 
response to, as a well as catering for, specific local conditions, what could be 
termed Lebanese “exceptionalism”. An example of this is the emergence of 
“quietist groups” such as the al-Abash with its exceptionally heterodox blend of 
Sunni and Shia doctrines wedded to a Sufi framework. This heterodoxy has 
clearly been one reason for the nascent Islamist revival among refugees who are 
influenced by the radicalisation of their Lebanese Sunni co-religionists. An 
example of this is the support for Lebanese Islamist groups such al-Abash and the 
Jamaa al-Islamiyaa. The future of Sunni-based Islamism in Lebanon hinges on 
local factors, in particular socio-economic conditions, as well as regional factors 
such as relations with Syria, the Arab-Israeli peace process and the fate of 
Islamism in the Middle East more generally (see, Hamzeh 1998: p. 249). The 
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future of Islamism among Palestinian refugees, however, is more complex and 
uncertain.  
 
The Palestinian refugee camps have become sites of contestation between militant 
Islamist movements and secular parties. The strength of this factional conflict is 
not simply a measure of Islamist sentiments in the refugee population but rather of 
the special security status tha t is accorded to the refugee camps. Lebanon is a 
small country (10,452 km2) where hiding is difficult and militant movements find 
it hard to evade government surveillance. This means that clandestine groups are 
drawn to Palestinian refugee camps, which can provide security cover and serve 
as a base for their political activities. An example of this is the military defeat of 
the Takfir wa al-Hijra in the Dinniyeh mountains and their subsequent refuge in 
the Ayn Hilwa camp. This strategic localisation represents a security problem for 
the camps and the Lebanese authorities and adds fuel to the claim that Palestinians 
are engaged in anti-Lebanese activities and should therefore be expelled. For the 
refugee community these incidents not only increase tensions in the camps across 
the country, but further tarnish the Palestinians’ reputation in Lebanon. This can, 
and probably will, be used to as enforce even stricter army control and 
surveillance in the camps, additional measures to insulate Palestinians from 
economic and political activities and louder demands for expelling the refugees 
from Lebanese soil. It will also increase demands to enforce the abolished Cairo 
Accords and proceed with disarming the Palestinian factions and stationing army 
troops inside the refugee camps. In the end, it could force the Lebanese 
government to attempt a military “showdown” against the militants in the camps. 
The future of Islamism among Palestinian refugees is therefore uncertain and 
depends in large part on whether the refugee camps retain their independent status 
or become subservient to the Lebanese security forces.      
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Summary 
In recent years there has been increasing academic interest in 
Islamism in the Middle East, not least in Palestinian Islamism 
championed by groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which 
are waging a bloody war of attrition against the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. There has been less 
concern with Islamism among the Palestinian refugees dispersed 
in Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. 
The paper outlines the sources of Islamism (“political Islam”) 
among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The rise of Islamism is a 
complex mix of contingent factors that is fuelled by social and 
political deprivation and shaped by divergent views on 
Palestinian nationalism (secular vs. Islamist), the Islamist revival 
in Lebanon and “strategic localisation” that turns refugee camps 
into battlefields between Palestinian factions. The Islamist groups 
cater for narrowly defined segments of the refugee population 
and have been unable to attract wider support. Instead, they 
cater for minor, camp-based constituencies which compete with 
secular groups for internal control of the camps and, by 
implication, of the Palestinian nationalist cause itself 
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